NEWS DESERTS IN UKRAINE

Mapping localities without local news

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What are news deserts?

The definition of "news deserts" originated in media studies in the United States in the early 2000s, when the number of local dailies first declined significantly amid the rise of digital first media. News deserts are communities that do not receive enough verified information about local issues and events.

The conceptualisation of this definition was based on the understanding that the democratic system in a country, specifically in the United States, begins at the local level. Thus, people's participation in the life of their community leads to a healthier society, and meaningful participation is impossible without a steady flow of truthful and verified information.

The search for news deserts is, in short, an attempt to identify those places where the healthy development of the democratic system is threatened by the absence of local media outlets. [6]

The concept of news deserts fits in with the idea that media outlets are inseparable from the location where they are based. That is why research on news deserts is developing quickly in various countries around the world – Norway, Spain, Switzerland, and even China. The  academic journal Media and Communications recently devoted an entire issue to the phenomenon of news deserts. Several studies from this journal are cited in this report. This issue is freely available, so we actively encourage anyone interested in media studies to read the journal and join the broader discussion about news deserts that we hope to start with this report.

We do not have a full picture of the situation in Ukraine because of the lack of previous research, although we can assume that the situation with local media has changed significantly during the war, following the privatisation of state-owned newspapers and decentralisation reform. Both the privatisation and decentralization reforms have started back in 2018. Before that every local governance body had its own print media outlet designed to inform people of decisions by said body. This was not the best practice for independence of local media so in wake of decentralization reform (redirecting power and revenue streams to benefit local governance) the media question was one of the most poignant ones. We’re still in that reform stage so there are no definitive registries or lists of media outlets now.

After the full-scale invasion begun in 2022, a number of media outlets have ceased to exist either due to physical damage done to their hromada (it was occupied or destroyed) or due to a dire financial situation following the collapse of local ad markets. The war have exacerbated the issue with local media and media registries, as there are paper trails of editorial teams that no longer operate.

What we can say for certain is that for objective reasons, people in the temporarily occupied territories do not receive verified information about their hromada (an administrative unit designating a village, several villages, or a town, and their adjacent territories). We conducted this study because we wanted to find out what is happening with local media across Ukraine.

Why research news deserts in Ukraine?

The purpose of the study was to collect information about such areas, as well as areas where the local media situation could lead to more news deserts being created, given that news deserts can damage a country's democratic development.

The emergence of news deserts has a direct impact on people's wellbeing. In places where local media outlets are closing (or do not exist at all), the community is measurably worse off. Some decisions on the allocation of resources/taxes go unmonitored, and local authorities have less of an incentive to be accountable to the community. In an article written in 2018, Judith Miller noted that in US counties where local news outlets disappear, the community pays higher utility bills and receives a less fair distribution of public funds. [1]

Furthermore, Ukraine is now in a situation where foreign investment for recovery is either already coming into various sectors or is in the process of being approved. Local authorities where there are local news outlets have to be held accountable to ensure that infrastructure reconstruction and/or hromada development projects are of maximum benefit to the population. It is worth noting here that we are not necessarily talking about investigations into local authorities and local services, but about daily coverage of their activities.

One of the main predictors of the growth of news deserts is the size of the population in a particular territorial unit. The more people live in a city, town, village or district, the more likely it is that there will be good local news outlets [2]. Ukraine’s population is declining, so the sooner we can identify hromadas that lack independent information about themselves, the more resources we can attract to create or support media in problem areas.

Another predictor is historical continuity. The more media outlets there have been in a region, the more established the connection is between local businesses and support for news outlets. Studies say this is because strong historical continuity creates a much stronger connection between local advertisers, donors or paying readers [2]. Consequently, such territorial units will become less likely to end up as news deserts. In the case of Ukraine, the issue of the historical continuity of media has been disrupted by the fact that combat actions in some areas have either made it completely impossible for independent media to operate or have significantly reduced local businesses’ advertising budgets for local media. By looking at the emergence of news deserts in this way, we can examine the history of the press in a particular area – whether there was competition between printed outlets before the internet, or whether there are some historical brands that the local community trusted before – and focus on trying to revitalise this historical connection.

Critical information needs and why we need this concept

In order for this study to draw valid conclusions that are applicable to all regions, we have proposed the concept of critical information needs as part of the methodology. We borrowed the definition and conceptualisation of critical information needs from the Annenberg School of Communication and Journalism at the University of Southern California [3].

We note that critical information needs of local communities are the information that is necessary for community members to be able to use this information:

to meet their safety and health needs;

to have full access to education, employment and business;

to participate fully in the social and political life of their communities.

The concept of critical information needs is essential if we are to see the media as engaged in systematic daily work to keep the community informed. The initial assumption of this study – that media freedom is the basis for sustainable democratic development – is also based on the fact that the public needs information about the fullest possible range of situations and services in order to make informed choices. There are 8 critical information needs:

1

Emergencies and Public Safety;

2

Health;

3

Education;

4

Transportation;

5

Environment and Planning;

6

Economic Development;

7

Civic Life.

8

Political Life.

Unfortunately, we have to state that many independent media outlets were not included in the map solely because they do not cover at least six of the eight needs identified in the methodology. Such outlets either focus on a specific issue of community life or produce lengthy articles that are published several times a month. While the community functioning would not be complete without such media, the purpose of this study was to map classic local news outlets that cover the full range of needs.

The critical information needs here are to do with the main public services and areas of life: public safety, healthcare, politics and governance, education, transport, economic development, the environment, and civic initiatives. There is more information about each of the critical information needs in the Methodology section.

Overview of the oblasts

In this research we have analyzed 11 oblasts. These are frontline and borderline regions that have been severely damaged during the full-scale invasion. We’re now working on gathering data to map all of Ukraine, i.e. 24 oblasts and Crimea Autonomous Republic. These 11 oblasts consist of 68 rayons (districts) and Kyiv city (which legally is a city of a special status). There are 879 functioning editorial teams, excluding non-institutionalised information sources, e.g. local Telegram-channels.

Therefore, we need the concept of district "health". This must be done to reduce all the information to a single indicator that can be visualised and therefore easily understood. In this study, the gradation is as follows:

«unhealthy» district – there are no media outlets based in the district and the district is not covered by news outlets from other districts OR there are no media outlets based in the district and the district is covered by only one media outlet from other districts;

«partially healthy» district – a district with ONE independent media outlet OR a district covered by at least two media outlets from other districts;

«healthy» district – a district with two or more independent news outlets.

The main results of this study are presented in three maps:

1

The first one shows the level of health of a particular district of Ukraine;

2

The second shows the areas that are covered by the media;

3

The third shows the areas where independent media are based.

What do we see now?

Districts' health

Map 1. Map of districts according to their health

The following are the main tendencies identified by the research team during data analysis.

First of all, following a reform in 2020 that reorganised Ukraine’s districts, merging many of them to form larger ones, the situation on the map is not critical. There are indeed "unhealthy districts", but the overall situation is better than it could be. With the exception of the temporarily occupied territories, most districts are "healthy" or "partially healthy". One of the limitations of this study is that there was no immersion at the amalgamated hromada level. We believe that the situation would be worse on closer examination.

Secondly, it is clear that districts with oblast centres are always "healthy". Each oblast centre has at least one independent editorial team – a regional branch of the public broadcasting company Suspilne and Ukrainian Radio. These meet the criteria of our methodology, being independent and covering most of the critical information needs. And that is the nature of centres of public life, due to the number of people living there and the logic of journalistic activity [2]. In general, the names of settlements that are far from the centres (district towns, villages) receive fewer mentions in the media (and media research) [4].

In the 11 oblasts covered by this study, we found 879 editorial teams that are definitely functioning at present. The average number of operating editorial teams per oblast is 60-70, with 10 or fewer of them being what we consider independent.

The majority of independent editorial teams were found in Kharkiv and Donetsk oblasts (14 and 13 respectively). The Kharkiv district (the area around and including the city of Kharkiv) is the "healthiest" of all the districts we studied, with 7 independent editorial teams.

Luhansk and Dnipro oblasts have the least number of independent media outlets (3 and 7 respectively). In the case of Luhansk Oblast, many media outlets have simply ceased to exist due to the temporary occupation. Therefore, all the media outlets that actually serve the critical information needs of Luhansk Oblast residents are currently operating as internally displaced outlets outside their home oblast. The same goes for all the districts marked on the map as "partially healthy" or "healthy" but under occupation.

Occupied territories (news deserts in times of war) and the concept of coverage

The temporarily occupied territories have their own arrangement of specific challenges. Hence, the separate chapter with conclusions on these regions. We see that media outlets exist that identify themselves as serving the information needs of the community in currently occupied cities and villages. Moreover, they define their mission as informing those members of the community who have left their hometown and are now somewhere else – in other oblasts or even countries.

However, the occupying authorities almost always restrict access to media outlets, either by blocking the entire .ua domain name or by targeting the whole media infrastructure, including channels on the messenger apps Telegram and Viber. So we cannot assume that these districts are really "healthy" or "partially healthy", as we are uncertain about how far audience reach is possible under occupation. Almost all media outlets from temporarily occupied hromadas are in exile, operating in the government-controlled part of Ukraine with only local informants. There are a few exceptions, although again, it's hard to judge the extent to which a media outlet's operations are based in temporarily occupied hromadas.

We also separately examined the media outlets' coverage, i.e. the residents of which districts they provide information to. Generally, media outlets report on the settlement and/or district where their infrastructure is located. For example, a media outlet from Shostka would cover news about that town and the Shostka district. However, other organisations see their goal as covering an entire oblast or region. The following map shows the rough number of media outlets that provide verified information about a particular district.

Districts' coverage

Coverage – at least 10 news items per week in an independent local media outlet

Map 2. Map of districts' coverage.

Why is there a difference between Kharkiv and Dnipro?

A reasonable question arises – why? The reasons why some districts lack local media are the same ones we have been citing in recent years: not enough personnel in the regions (for a combination of reasons such as the lower prestige of the profession, the high turnover of employees who move to work for national or international media, and editorial teams having insufficient resources to retain and train quality professionals), no culture of donating to media outlets, Telegram channels covering basic information needs, and so on.

Unfortunately, we cannot refer to demographic data or regional economic indicators because these statistics are not available. Ukraine's State Statistics Service has been releasing some statistical bulletins with delays due to martial law and has released no regional economic indicators since January 2022. One study points out that the media's connection with local businesses is crucial to avoid news deserts [2]. When there is no information about the population and its social and demographic characteristics, predicting a media outlet's audience and the market size of a particular region overall is challenging. A socio-economic analysis of the oblasts is one of the next steps to take to expand our knowledge about news deserts in Ukraine.

Ultimately, until further research is done, the only explanation we have is the historical continuity of the region and the prevalence of an established practice of independent media. That certainly would not explain the significance of one particular charismatic leader who has been able to launch several small media outlets in one district. Nor does it explain the "health" of sparsely populated districts such as Koriukivka in Chernihiv Oblast, where the population of the district centre is less than 20,000. However, this explanation does apply to districts that we know are cultural centres, and Kharkiv has been just that in recent decades. For this reason, the Kharkiv district is leading the way in terms of independent media in Ukraine.

Station regions of independent local media outlets

Station – the city or district where the core part of the editorial team or head office is located.

Map 3. Map of station regions of local media outlets.

Conclusions

We are only just starting to learn what is happening with the media in the regions at the macro level. All the maps presented here are just the beginning of a conversation about the fact that many hromadas in Ukraine lack verified and independent information about themselves. Moreover, when we look at who is quoted by media covering areas that do not have their own outlets, we find that these are often official sources (city authorities, military administrations, police, prosecutors). During the data collection process, we came across cases of eight-page newspapers that consisted entirely of reprinted press releases with no original journalism at all. In some ways, these media resemble the concept of "ghosts" [7], i.e. media operating from outside the hromada and having no contextual understanding. This is also a topic for separate research.

Nevertheless, a news desert does not mean that people know nothing about their district/region/city. They get plenty of information from their friends’ and acquaintances’ social media [5]. In Ukraine, local Telegram channels provide this information.

"This year, Telegram continued to be the primary social network for news consumption, showing significant continued growth to 72%," the USAID/Internews annual media consumption survey reported. [8]

We did not take channels whose ownership structure cannot be traced into account in our study, so some "unhealthy" districts may have sufficient resources for the hromada to be kept informed that do not fall under the classical definition of media. Further research is needed on this topic or on the information ecosystems of specific oblasts or cities.

In the meantime, it is our hope that further work by media support organisations, both service providers and donors, will focus on reducing the number and volume of news deserts.

FAQ

How does this map differ from those that already exist?
Our task was not to show the organisations that we are prepared to recommend, but the situation across the country – which hromadas do not have independent information about themselves. That is why there are no names or websites of editorial teams here, as that would distract from the purpose of the study, shifting the focus to the media that should or must be monitored.
Does your list include _name of editorial team_?
Most likely, yes. We have tried to identify the sources of information about and for a hromada as accurately as possible. Consequently, we searched for newspapers, listened to local radio stations (if available), read Telegram channels, and did a lot of media searching in individual settlements or districts.
What are the weaknesses of this study? What's missing? What should be added?
First of all, we definitely could not cover all the media outlets that exist in Ukraine. We needed outlets to have at least some kind of online presence in order to understand that a particular editorial team exists, that it has not closed and continues to function. So for example, newspapers that are listed in the Ukrposhta catalogue (Ukrposhta is the state-owned postal service operator) but do not even have screenshots of their front page on the internet were not included in our sample. Similarly, if it was not possible to listen to a local radio station online, we had to disregard it. The reason is simple: both newspapers and radio are strongly tied geographically to a particular point – a particular hromada or transmitter tower – and unfortunately it is just not possible for us to travel all over Ukraine with a radio and buy all the newspapers that are published in the regions. It's not even that simple with online media, as we can't guarantee that we have found every outlet that informs a hromada.
Second, there is the matter of the temporarily occupied territories. On the one hand, there are media outlets that serve the temporarily occupied hromadas, and some of these are growing rapidly and investing in their development. On the other hand, access to these media outlets is severely restricted, if not completely closed, for residents of a particular hromada, who may even receive death threats if they are found to have subscribed to these outlets. Therefore, unfortunately, we have not been able to find a proper solution to this problem within the framework of the methodology we have developed, and we would ask you to keep this in mind as well.
Thirdly, this study makes no mention of Ukrainian national media, except for the public broadcaster Suspilne, which has a network of editorial teams in oblast centres. This is a deliberate limitation, as our goal was to focus on the local market. Consequently, the city of Kyiv and Kyiv Oblast are represented here by local media outlets that cover the agenda of Kyiv and Kyiv Oblast.
Fourth, many media outlets that we consider good have been filtered out by our methodology. Some give no indication of their ownership structure or a legal entity that can be found in open data sources. Others do not cover all the critical information needs because they focus on a specific topic or niche. Some are exclusively engaged in investigative journalism and therefore also do not cover all of the community’s critical information needs (although they undoubtedly do vital work).
We are aware of these shortcomings, and the research team had long discussions on each of these points, which resulted in a compromise that became the methodology for this study.
Where did you look for media if there is no general register yet?
We downloaded the old register of print media and consulted all the databases we could get our hands on (some of which were of very dubious quality, while others provided information that was difficult for us to verify on our own, such as the absence of broadcasting of specific channels in specific regions). We did a lot of research on search engines and social media, and studied citations of local media in larger nationwide outlets.
How many editorial teams did you analyse in total?
On average, there are 60-70 media outlets per oblast. The total number is 879 media outlets in 11 oblasts. Those are the ones we have found so far.
It should be noted here that this figure of 879 only represents more or less institutionalised media that can be defined as outlets. It does not include the many Telegram channels that can play a fundamental role in informing the community, or influencers or other social media users who act as news aggregators.

References

1

Judith Miller (2018). News Deserts: No News is bad News (Urban Policy, Manhattan Institute).

2

Edward Malthouse and Jaewon Choi and Zach Metzger and Larry DeGaris (2023). Forecasting Future News Deserts.

3

Friedland, Lewis, Philip M.Napoli, Katya Ognyanova, Carola Weil, and Ernest J.WilsonIII. 2012. Review of the Literature Regarding Critical Information Needs of the American Public. http://transition.fcc.gov/Literature_Review.pdf.

4

Vogler, D., Weston, M., & Udris, L. (2023). Investigating News Deserts on the Content Level: Geographical Diversity in Swiss News Media. Media and Communication, 11(3), 343-354. https://doi.org/10.17645/mac.v11i3.6794

5

Collier, Jessica R., and Emily Graham. 2022. Even in “News Deserts” People Still Get News. Austin: Center for Media Engagement.

6

Abernathy, P. M. (2018). The expanding news desert. Chapel Hill, NC: Center for Innovation and Sustainability in Local Media, School of Media and Journalism, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.

7

Cross, A., Mark Caro | Local News Ini, & Reger, R. (2023, December 5). Rural Mirages: Shattered Papers and “ghosts” without local news. Local News Initiative. https://localnewsinitiative.northwestern.edu/posts/2023/12/05/ghost-newspaper-solutions/

8

Українці значною мірою покладаються на telegram канали для отримання новин під час війни. Internews in Ukraine. (2023, November 1). https://internews.in.ua/uk/news/ukraintsi-znachnoiu-miroiu-pokladaiutsia-na-telegram-kanaly-dlia-otrymannia-novyn-pid-chas-viyny/

TEAM

Maks Sribnyi

Maksym Sribnyi

Head of Research at MDF, MA in Journalism at NaUKMA

Polina Lypova

Researcher at Media Development Foundation, MA in Communications at Kyiv-Mohyla Academy, sociologist.

Oksana Buts

Researcher at Media Development Foundation, sociologist, BA in Sociology at UCU, MA in Sociology at NaUKMA.

Ievhen Kohen

Research assistant at the Media Development Foundation, MA in History of Philosophy at NaUKMA, work experience in national and regional media

Nataliia Fedor

Research assistant at Media Development Foundation, sociologist, BA in Sociology at UCU.

Anastasiia Tovstanovska

Research assistant at Media Development Foundation, Student of Sociology at UCU.

Andriy Boborykin

Andrey Boborykin

the author of the idea

Executive Director of the UP. Expert in digital marketing, development of media products and media communities, building funding models for the media.

This research was produced with the financial support of the European Union. Its contents are the sole responsibility of Media Development Foundation and do not necessarily reflect the views of the European Union.

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